

soon as possible. " I am still very anxious about Morocco/* rejoined the Chancellor. " German opinion is on the alert. French influence is growing, whether she wishes it or not. If you leave Fez, you will be compelled to return within a year. In Germany people will say that German interests are being neglected, and I see the possibility of extremely grave difficulties," " Possibly/* replied the Ambassador, " but nobody can prevent Morocco falling one day under our influence. Why should we not discuss all outstanding matters except Alsace-Lorraine ? We could try to give German opinion satisfaction which would allow it to watch our influence in Morocco develop without disquiet." " I will think it over," rejoined the Chancellor; " but go and see Kiderlen at Kissingen." Jules Gambon took his advice. On June 22 some plain speaking took place. The situation, began the Foreign Secretary, had been completely transformed, with forces under French officers throughout the country and a Sultan at the orders of France. " Have you forgotten the compact of 1909," retorted the Ambassador, " which recognizes French political influence ? " " Influence is not Protectorate," rejoined Kiderlen, " and you are on the road to organize a veritable Protectorate." Gambon observed that it was not easy in dealing with a barbarous country to fix how far influence could go, and proposed a general discussion like that between France and England in 1903. " I agree," was the reply; " if we confine ourselves to Morocco we shall not succeed. It is useless to plaster over a tottering structure." The Ambassador explained that French opinion would not allow Germany any part of Morocco, but " one could look elsewhere." " Yes," replied Kiderlen, " but you must tell us what you want. Bring us back something from Paris." Gambon

travelled straight
home, where he reported the conversation to
Cruppi. The

same evening the Monis Cabinet fell.

Till this moment the policy of Germany had
been irre-
proachable. She possessed treaty rights and
commercial
interests in Morocco. Warnings conveyed in
courteous terms
had produced no effect. Kiderlen, like Holstein
before him,
was prepared to take risks. As long ago as April"
the Swabian
Bismarck," as his admirers called him, told his
friend Weiz-
sacker, the Premier of Wurttemberg, that he
was meditating
the occupation of Agadir. The action of Spain
indicated that
the hour had struck. A Foreign Office
memorandum drafted
on May 30 argued that north Morocco would
soon be French,